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Abstract
This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their
allocations, but also on the well-being of other persons, can produce both large and testable
e¤ects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to …rms. We show
that even small deviations from purely “sel…sh” preferences leads to widespread workplace skill
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care somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are “close”.
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1 Introduction
We have by now ample evidence that preferences of individuals between allocations do not
depend only on their own material well-being. Rather, the actions and material allocations
of other individuals impact directly a person’s utility, and are thus taken into account when
making a decision. But the research in models of “social preferences,” as they are sometimes
called, has not delivered empirical implications which change qualitatively our view of economic
behavior. We show, however, that these models produce both large and testable e¤ects. We
study worker allocation to …rms in a contract-theoretic framework, where agents di¤er in their
productivity. We show that even small deviations from purely “sel…sh” preferences leads to
widespread workplace skill segregation.
The current interest in social preferences’ models arises in a large part to explain “anomalous”
results from experimental economics. The papers in the area typically devote entire sections to
show that their models can robustly account for the data generated by many di¤erent experi-
ments. In doing so, they often estimate coe¢cients for the models. The coe¢cients estimated
are, however, typically small, even for the relatively small stakes games played in the laboratory.
The approach is, then, subject to the criticism that social preferences will lead only to small
scale e¤ects in the real world. Therefore, it could be argued that it is not useful to incorporate
them into mainstream models of labor markets, consumer behavior, and so on. Our aim is to
show that this view is incorrect.
We study a labor market in which …rms compete for workers of heterogeneous (and unobserv-
able) quality by o¤ering (menus of) contracts. Social preferences’ models involve interpersonal
comparisons of utility across agents. It is natural to assume that these comparisons do not
necessarily span the whole population, but only individuals who are “close.” This is implicitly
acknowledged by current research on social preferences, as, in the typical application, the com-
parisons are only among agents playing a particular game. However, the range of interpersonal
comparisons has been a generally neglected issue. To make the notion of closeness precise, we
introduce a spatial structure in the model. Firms choose locations in a ring, and workers com-
pare their material payo¤s to those of workers in their same …rm and in other …rms located
within a certain distance in the ring.1
The e¢ciency units of workers’ labor are perfect substitutes but the individual endowments
of e¢ciency units are the private information of each worker. That is, some workers are more
productive/skilled than others, but workers of di¤erent skills are perfectly substitutable in some
…xed proportions. With this structure, and the traditional “sel…sh” preferences, the equilibria
would not make a prediction on the distribution of skill levels by …rm or location. Any dis-
tribution would be consistent with equilibrium. With the introduction of social preferences, of
however small strength, the equilibrium becomes both skill and spatially segregated, that is,
…rms hire only from one skill pool and …rms employing workers of a given skill level form spatial
1Fehr et al. (2000) and Fershtman et al. (2001) are other attempts to embed social preferences in standard
economic models. Those papers consider a moral hazard contracting setting with fairness-minded agents, and analyze
the optimal incentive structure and workforce …rm composition. As in our paper, social preferences, however small,
generate interesting twists with respect to the traditional approach with self-interested individuals.
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clusters.2
The segregation and clustering results would also hold in a model with complete information.
We introduce incomplete information for two reasons. First of all, the incomplete information
makes it more evident that the externality driving segregation is di¤erent than the one in models
of say, racial segregation. We deal here with a pecuniarity externality, that is, high-skilled types
do not separate from low-skill types because they intrinsically dislike them. They do it, rather,
because the market tends to produce di¤erent material payo¤s for both. Second, having a model
that is robust to incomplete information is an obvious strength that is introduced at a relatively
low complexity cost.
2 Background and related work
We bring together several strands of the economics literature.
Research on social preferences originated in large measure to give account of the growing
empirical and experimental evidence that human behavior could not be explained only by the
hypothesis of self-interested material payo¤ maximization. For instance, contribution to public
goods is higher than would be expected under purely sel…sh maximization.3 More importantly
from our point of view, there is vast amounts of evidence that people reject lopsided o¤ers
in ultimatum bargaining games (Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze 1982).4 Several models
have been proposed to account for these observations. Bolton (1991), Rabin (1993), Levine
(1998), Bolton and Ockenfels (1999), Fehr and Schmidt (2000a), Charness and Rabin (2000). It
would be too di¢cult to discuss all those models in detail, so we refer to the excellent surveys
of Sobel (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (2000b). A feature that many of the models share
is that individuals dislike payo¤ inequality. Our innovation with respect to this literature is
that we think explicitly about the set of individuals to which the utility comparisons apply.
We also provide further testable implications for the model (and implicitly relevant economic
applications).
There is also evidence that …rms workforces are more homogenous than simple “random
matching” would suggest. People of di¤erent skill levels sort themselves into di¤erent …rms. For
instance, Kramarz et al. (1996) compute a measure a specialization for di¤erent professional
categories proposed by Kremer and Maskin (1996). They …nd that specialization increased mas-
sively in France between 1986 and 1992.5 Davis and Haltinwanger (1991) note the continuous
rise in wage inequality in the U.S. which is imputable in part to ability sorting of workers across
…rms. Brown and Medo¤ (1991) investigate explanations for wage-size di¤erentials. They …nd
evidence in support only for explanations based on sorting by worker skill. Theoretical expla-
nations for this evidence usually resort to the introduction of some form of complementarities
2 In a sense we can argue that social preferences operate here as a kind of “equilibrium-re…nement.” The advantage
of this way of re…ning equilibria is that the payo¤ perturbation is economically and empirically well-motivated.
3See Ledyard’s (1995) survey on public goods in the Handbook of Experimental Economics.
4See also Roth’s (1995) survey on bargaining in the Handbook of Experimental Economics.
5“Blue collar unskilled workers are more and more separated from other types of workers, and therefore, tend to
work together in the same …rms. This is true for each of the six categories of skills. The number even doubled for
clerks.” Kramarz et al. (1996), p. 375.
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between individuals of the same skill levels. Good examples of these explanations are de Bar-
tolomé (1990), Bénabou (1993), Kremer and Maskin (1996) and Saint-Paul (2001). We depart
from this by not postulating any form of production complementarities between worker’s types.
The externality that arises between workers is of a pecuniary nature. It arises because market
outcomes favor more productive workers, and individuals are averse to inequalities in their own
neighborhood.6
3 The model
There are N workers, with two types, L and H, which are their private information. The
productivity of a worker of type t 2 fL;Hg is µt. We assume that µH > µL. The prior
probability of an H type is 1 > p > 0. The material payo¤ function of a worker i who receives
a wage w, and exerts e¤ort e, is:
ui (w; ejt) = w ¡ ct(e)
The function ct(e) represents the disutility experienced by a worker of type t when exerting
e¤ort e. For a given e¤ort level, e 6= 0, the cost of e¤ort of an L type is higher than that of an
H type, that is, cL(e) > cH(e). We also assume that ct;e (e; µ) > 0 and ct;ee (e; µ) > 0, for all
t 2 fL;Hg.7 E¤ort levels are veri…able.
Individuals are embedded in a network of social relationships. In addition to the utility they
obtain from their own wage and e¤ort, which we call their material payo¤s, they also experience
utility (or disutility) from the material payo¤s of close neighbors in their network. Denote by
Ni the set of neighbors of i (excluding himself) and by ni its size. Individuals dislike inequality,
so their extended “social payo¤s” are of the form
Ui = ui ¡ 1
ni
X
j2Ni
V (uj ¡ ui)
where V (0) = 0, and V (x) > 0, when x 6= 0. We assume that jV 0 (x)j < 1: That is, the marginal
impact of inequality (even considering the whole group) is not larger than the impact of a
marginal increase in material payo¤ of the same size. Our results are robust to heterogeneity in
fairness concern between individuals, and we may allow for a player speci…c inequality aversion
term Vi (¢), i 2 N .
There are F > N identical …rms.8 They locate in at most L ¸ 3F + 1 di¤erent nodes of a
ring. In particular, we allow for more than one …rm to occupy the same location. Each …rm
can employ any number of workers, and technology is constant returns to scale. Net pro…t for
6There are other models of segregation which rely on group externalities. Seminal works in this area are Becker
(1957) and Schelling (1971). Contrary to our paper, in that literature the individuals have an intrinsic like or dislike
of workers in their or other groups. In our case, the spillover is related only to the market outcome. High and low
types would live happily together if wages were equal.
7 In fact, we need to ensure that indi¤erence curves are non-thick and generate strictly convex upper contour sets.
8Alternatively, we could assume that the number of …rms is endogenously determined, and our results would not
change.
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each worker is equal to his productivity µ, minus the wage w he receives. Firms’ pro…ts are
determined by the sum of pro…ts per worker. If the …rm does not employ any worker, it makes
zero pro…ts.
The game proceeds in three stages. First, each …rm chooses a location in the ring. Second,
each …rm o¤ers a menu of contracts to some workers which speci…es the wage and e¤ort required
of di¤erent worker types. Recall that types are private information of the workers, but e¤ort
levels are veri…able, thus contractible. Third, each worker i speci…es the menus acceptable to
him, and the contracts within this menu that he would take. A worker who does not accept any
contract obtains a reservation payo¤ of zero.
An employed worker gets the material payo¤s derived by the implemented contract in the
…rm for which he works. The neighborhood of some employed worker i, Ni, is composed by
those workers (if any) employed by …rms located in i’s employer node, and in the two adjacent
nodes. This neighborhood is the one that enters in the determination of the …nal social payo¤s.
4 Results
In this section we show that, for the game we just described, in all the subgame perfect equilibria
where agents do not use dominated strategies, di¤erent types of workers earn a wage equal to
their productivity, but they work in di¤erent locations. Workers earn their productivity for the
usual reasons in a model with competitive wage-setters. The intuition for the spatial segregation
result is simple. Since wages equal productivities, and those di¤er across workers, a low type
working in an environment with high types su¤ers because of his aversion to inequality. A
competitor …rm which is making zero pro…ts in that environment can pro…tably deviate. He can
do so by moving to an empty location and o¤ering a wage slightly below his productivity to the
low type that works around high types. Provided this wage is close enough to the productivity,
the worker will accept and the …rm makes strictly positive pro…ts.
Given the simplicity of the intuitions involved, it may come as a bit of a surprise that we
need to resort to undominated subgame perfect equilibrium as a solution concept. The reason
becomes more apparent once we look at the following example, which we have stripped down to
the essentials to be easier to follow. In particular we have even dispensed with the incomplete
information and the cost of e¤ort.
Example 1 Let two workers, L and H, whose respective productivities, µL and µH, are common
knowledge. They have no cost of e¤ort. There are 4 …rms and 13 nodes in a ring.9 The following
actions form part of a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. Firm 1 locates on node 1 and o¤ers
worker L a wage equal to µL and worker H a wage equal to µH , …rm 2 locates on node 1 and
o¤ers worker L a wage equal to µL, …rm 3 locates on node 6 and o¤ers worker L a wage
w3L = µL ¡ V (µH ¡ µL), and worker H a wage equal to µH , …rm 4 locates on node 6 and o¤ers
worker H a wage equal to µH : Worker H accepts the o¤er of …rm 1 and worker L accepts the
o¤er of …rm 3.
9 In fact, 8 locations are enough for our purpose.
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The use of dominated strategies by both the …rms and the workers is crucial in the construc-
tion of the example. In the example, …rms make many o¤ers of wages equal to productivity that
are not used in the equilibrium path. Those unused o¤ers, which are weakly dominated, are
what (out of equilibrium) supports the equilibrium outcome we postulate. Even more impor-
tantly, the responses of the players are also (almost) dominated. Take, for example, a deviation
by …rm 2 to location 3 that o¤ers the L worker a salary w2L higher than the one he obtains in
equilibrium. If L accepts this o¤er, he is sure to obtain a utility equal to w2L, as he is sure not
to experience disutility from inequality. On the other hand, if he accepts (as we postulate in the
proof) the standing o¤er of …rm 1, his utility depends on whether worker H indeed decides to
accept the standing o¤er of 4. In fact, for w2L arbitrarily close to µL, he has to be arbitrarily sure
that H will indeed move. We …nd this rather unsatisfactory because of its probable unrealism.
There is one problem that arises if we choose to eliminate dominated strategies. When
wages can be chosen from the real numbers, the set of undominated strategies is open. Any
wage that is strictly smaller than the productivity of a worker is undominated, but a wage equal
to productivity is weakly dominated. So we cannot construct Nash equilibria in undominated
strategies, as any wage o¤er di¤erent from the productivity can always be defeated by a nearby
proposal. To get rid of this di¢culty, we discretize the wage space. We consider a family of
discrete wage spaces with increasingly …ne grids that approaches the continuum when the grids
becomes ini…nitely …ne.
More precisely, let n0; n1; n2; : : : be an increasing sequence of integers such that nk ! +1.
For each k 2 IN, let
£k =
n a
nk
j a 2 IN
o
:
We assume that µt =2 £k, for all k 2 IN and t 2 fL;Hg.10 For all k 2 IN, let "k = 1=nk, and for
all t 2 fL;Hg, let µkt = argmax
©
x · µt j x 2 £k
ª
. By de…nition, µkt is the highest element in
the discrete wage space £k smaller than type t’s productivity. We have, "k > µt ¡ µkt > 0, for
all t 2 fL;Hg.
The location and contracting game where …rms chose wages in £k is denoted by Gk.
Proposition 2 There exists an integer K such that, for all k ¸ K, k 2 IN, at every subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of Gk, contracts accepted with positive probability are di¤erent across
types, and pay t type employees a wage µkt , t 2 fL;Hg.
Corollary 3 When k ! +1, contracts accepted with positive probability pay employees exactly
their productivity.
The presence of social preferences does not change the contracts observed in equilibrium,
with respect to the equilibrium contracts when agents do not have extended preferences. The
proof is very similar as the one for the standard model. One needs to be a bit careful with the
deviations that defeat non-equilibrum outcomes. The problem is that those deviations could
increase inequality, so either they would not be followed, or they would be too expensive to be
pro…table. However, we have assumed that a marginal increase in inequality (even considering
the whole group) is not more valuable than an increase in material payo¤ of the same size. We
10Precisely, to avoid including a weakly dominated strategy in the wage space.
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have also assumed that the number of locations is high enough for any …rm to be able to relocate
at an empty location with no …rms close by. This allows to construct deviations that are just like
the ones in the standard proofs, adjusted for the potential increase in the inequality. Example
7 at the end of this section shows that without this second assumption, our segregation result
would not hold.
The main di¤erence between the equilibria in our model and the ones in the standard model
is that …rms, here, do not employ workers of di¤erent types. Otherwise some …rm would have
a deviation that would allow it to earn strictly positive pro…ts by attracting workers of just
one type with a lower salary. Their decrease in material payo¤s is compensated by a decrease
in disutility due to a more egalitarian work environment. So in any equilibrium, types are
geographically separated. One consequence of this segregation is that, at equilibrium, contracts
accepted with positive probability are identical within types, irrespective of employee’s location.
Proposition 4 There exists an integer K such that, for all k ¸ K, k 2 IN, at every sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium of Gk, …rms are spatially segregated by types separated by empty
locations.
Social preferences thus predict both skill and spatial workplace segregation as, at equilibrium,
…rms hire only from one skill pool and …rms employing workers of a given skill level form spatial
clusters.
Remark 5 All previous results hold when individuals are averse to wage inequality, rather than
inequality in material payo¤s (that is, wages minus cost of contracted e¤ort), and extended social
payo¤s are of the form
Ui = ui ¡ 1
ni
X
j2Ni
Vi(wj ¡ wi);
where, for all i 2 N, Vi(0) = 0, Vi(x) > 0, when x 6= 0, and jV 0i (x)j < 1:11
Remark 6 All previous results hold with arbitrary neighborhood structures, as long as the num-
ber of available locations L and the number of …rms F are such that L ¸ (maxi2N fNig+1)F+1.
We have assumed that the number of possible locations, L, is such that L ¸ 3F +1, where F
is the number of …rms. The following example shows that …rms may not be spatially segregated
by types (separated by empty locations) when this assumption does not hold.
Example 7 There are F = 4 …rms locating on at most L = 4 di¤erent nodes, 2 workers of type
L and 2 workers of type H. Individual productivities are common knowledge and workers have
no cost of e¤ort. Extended preferences are of the form
Ui = ui ¡ 1
ni
X
j2Ni
® juj ¡ uij , 0 · ® < 1:
There exists a non-segregated equilibrium with one H type worker at nodes 1 and 2, and one
L type worker at nodes 3 and 4. Each worker is employed by one …rm and wages are equal to
productivities.
11See Bramoullé (2001) for a critical account of di¤erent structures of social preferences: (i) concern for others’
allocations, (ii) concern for others’ material payo¤s, and (iii) concern for others’ extended social payo¤s.
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5 Conclusion
This paper shows that small deviations from “sel…sh” preferences leads to a very stark sorting
of workers into …rms by abilities. This coincides with empirically observed sorting patterns. A
natural question is whether our explanation is more important than others for explaining the
observation. One competing hypothesis, which would lead to similar results in our context,
is that workers of the same type have complementary sets of skills. The two hypothesis are
observationally distinguishable in other environments, however.
In our model, the pecuniary externality is driven by the fact that …rms compete between
themselves. In the absence of that externality there would be no reason for separation. So if a
…rm had market power in the labor market, and the outside option of workers was not related to
their type (say, the skills were highly job-speci…c), all workers would be paid the same. Thus, our
model would not predict sorting, whereas the model with complementarities would still predict
them. While it is not easy to think of markets that precisely …t those conditions, there are
many markets for quali…ed workers in Europe, like those of physicians and teachers, where the
public sector has strong market power. If the amount of sorting in those markets were somewhat
smaller than in others for workers of similar characteristics, our hypothesis would clearly have
explanatory power. More empirical …eld work seems like a good avenue for further research.
On the other hand, experimental work appears to be more challenging for this topic than
for others that have to do with social preferences. It will be di¢cult to control in the lab the
network structure of preferences. Perhaps by choosing subjects from physically distant places,
and running the experiment on the Internet, one could emulate the social structure of the model.
In any case, we believe that a contribution of this paper is that it confronts the …eld with the
important issue of who is included in the interpersonal comparisons and how much. Perhaps a
better understanding of this issue would also contribute to clarify the other important (at least
from an evolutionary point of view) question of why agents care about payo¤ di¤erences.
One other observation on empirical testing arises from the fact that individuals may not be
averse to inequality when the output measure of others is very objective. It may be debatable
who is the best economist in a certain department (the current fashion for ranking individuals
notwithstanding), but is is less controversial who is the top scorer in a soccer team. If indeed
aversion to inequality depends on the objectivity of the output measure, then one would expect
less sorting by skill-type (thus more within-…rm inequality) in soccer teams that in universities.
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Let k 2 IN and Gk the corresponding game. We denote bymkf;i =
D
wkf;i;L; e
k
f;i;L;w
k
f;i;H ; e
k
f;i;H
E
the menu of contracts o¤ered by …rm f to player i. For all i 2 N , let Mki = fmkf;igf2F denote
the set of contracts o¤ered to player i by all …rms. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium of Gk’s
second stage (acceptance) game is a pro…le of accepted menus
¡
sk1 ; : : : ; s
k
n
¢ 2 £i2NMki .
Proof of Proposition 2. We decompose it into the following lemmata.
Lemma 8 For all k 2 IN, at every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of Gk, …rms ex ante pro…ts
are nonnegative and strictly smaller than "k.
Proof. Suppose not. Let k 2 IN and Gk the corresponding game. Then there exists some
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of Gk where some …rms ex ante pro…ts are higher or
equal than "k. Consider such a SPNE, denoted by ¤SPNE.
Let mk¤ be the menu that makes the highest expected pro…t at ¤SPNE. This menu is o¤ered
by some …rm f to some player i, that is, mk¤ = mk¤f;i;L =
D
wk¤f;i;L; e
k¤
f;i;L;w
k¤
f;i;H ; e
k¤
f;i;H
E
, and
player i accepts it. Let ti 2 fL;Hg denote player i’s type. Given that f ’s ex ante pro…ts are
higher or equal than "k, necessarily µti ¡wk¤f;i;ti ¸ "k. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: µL ¡ wk¤f;i;L ¸ "k. Consider some …rm g 6= f making zero pro…ts at ¤SPNE. The
condition F > N guarantees that such a …rm exists. Let g deviate by locating at an empty
location surrounded by two empty adjacent locations. The condition L ¸ 3F+1 guarantees that
such a location exists. Let g o¤er player i the menu of contractsmk±g;i =
D
µkL; e
k¤
f;i;L;w
k¤
f;i;H ; e
k¤
f;i;H
E
at this location. We have µL ¡ wk¤f;i;L ¸ "k > µL ¡ µkL, implying in particular that µkL > wk¤f;i;L.
Player i may be simultaneously receiving o¤ers from other …rms (besides from g) which are
equivalent, in terms of material payo¤s, to mk±g;i. But, if player i didn’t accept those o¤ers at
the ¤SPNE, it is because player i would have faced a strict disutility due to inequality in case
of accepting them. At g’s new location, there is certainly no inequality. At any other location,
though, the extended utility accruing from any menu equivalent to mk±g;i in terms of material
payo¤s depends, in general, on the reactions of other players. Therefore, it is a weakly dominant
strategy for player i to accept mk±g;i, and g’s deviation is pro…table in expected terms.
Case 2: µL ¡ wk¤f;i;L < "k. Then, necessarily, µH ¡ wk¤f;i;H ¸ "k. Let g 6= f making zero
pro…ts at ¤SPNE, deviating by locating at an empty location surrounded by two empty adjacent
locations, and o¤ering player i the menu of contracts mk±g;i =
D
wk¤f;i;L; e
k¤
f;i;L; µ
k
H ; e
k¤
f;i;H
E
at this
location. It is a weakly dominant strategy for player i to accept g’s o¤er given that it increases
his material payo¤s, and there is no disutility due to inequality at g’s new location (and g’s
deviation is pro…table). Indeed, switching contracts modi…es both the material payo¤s and the
inequality payo¤s accruing to some individual. Given that jV 0 (x)j < 1, variations in inequality
induced by unilateral switching of contracts do never o¤set the corresponding variations in
material payo¤s, and unilateral decisions to pick up a contract out of an array of alternatives are
governed solely by material payo¤ concerns. Therefore, no L type worker accepts
³
µkH ; e
k¤
f;i;H
´
because the corresponding material payo¤s are strictly lower than those obtained with some
alternative o¤ered contract.
Lemma 9 There exists an integer K such that, for all k ¸ K, k 2 IN, at every subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of Gk, contracts of di¤erent types accepted with positive probability are
di¤erent.
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Proof. Suppose not. Let k 2 IN and Gk the corresponding game. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. There exists one …rm f that o¤ers a menu mk =
­
wk; ek;wk; ek
®
with identical wage
wk and e¤ort level ek to both workers’ types. In the e¤ort-wage space, denote by U±H the strict
upper contour set corresponding to the material payo¤s of an H type worker applying for …rm
f at its location. Similarly, denote by UL the upper contour set of the material payo¤s of an
L type worker applying for …rm f at its location. Consider some …rm g making zero pro…ts.
Suppose that g deviates to an empty location and o¤ers a menu
­
wk; ek; ewk; ek® to some of f ’s
current workers, where
¡ ewk; ek¢ is chosen in ªk = (U±HnUL) \ ©w < µH j w 2 £kª. We show
that for k high enough, ªk 6= ;. By assumption, for all e 2 IR+, cL (e) > cH (e). Therefore, for
k high enough, U±HnUL 6= ;. We are left to prove that (U±HnUL) \
©
w < µH j w 2 £k
ª 6= ;. It
su¢ces to show that, for k high enough, wk < µkH . Suppose on the contrary that, for all k 2
IN, wk ¸ µkH. For k high enough, µkH > µL. For such values of k, f ’s ex post pro…ts made with
H type workers are smaller or equal than "k, whereas f ’s ex post pro…ts made with L type
workers are strictly negative. There is a positive probability that L type workers accept menu
mk. Therefore, given that "k # 0, when k ! +1, there exists an integer K such that, for all
k ¸ K, f ’s ex ante pro…ts are negative, which violates Lemma 8. Therefore, for all k ¸ K, we
have wk < µkH . With such menu of contracts, it is a weakly dominant strategy for all H type
workers in f ’s workforce to accept g’s o¤er given that it increases their material payo¤s, and
there is no disutility due to inequality at g’s new location. This deviation is pro…table to g.
Case 2. There exists one …rm f1 who o¤ers a menu m
k
1 including contract
¡
wk; ek
¢
only
accepted by L type workers and a …rm f2 who o¤ers a menu m
k
2 including contract
¡
wk; ek
¢
only accepted by H type workers. But then, by Lemma 8, all ex post pro…ts of …rm f1 with L
type workers are nonnegative and smaller or equal than "k, implying that wk = µkL. Similarly,
all ex post pro…ts of …rm f2 with H type workers are nonnegative and smaller or equal than "
k,
implying that wk = µkH , which is impossible as, for high enough values of k, we have µ
k
L 6= µkH .
Lemma 10 There exists an integer K such that, for all k ¸ K, k 2 IN, at every subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of Gk, contracts accepted with positive probability by L type workers
(resp. H type workers) o¤er wage µkL (resp. wage µ
k
H), that is, contracts accepted with positive
probability make ex post pro…ts which are nonnegative and strictly smaller than "k.
Proof. Let k 2 IN and Gk the corresponding game. We …rst show that for any …rm f and
independently of its location, the wage wkf;i;L proposed by f to some player i, and accepted by
i whenever ti = L, is such that wkf;i;L ¸ µkL. Suppose on the contrary that some …rm f o¤ers at
some location a wage wkf;i;L < µ
k
L which is part of a contract accepted with positive probability.
Consider some …rm g making zero pro…ts. Suppose that g deviates to an empty location and
o¤ers the contract
³
µkL; e
k
f;i;L
´
to some of f ’s current workers. Then, g makes ex post pro…ts
which are higher or equal than "k with any worker eager to accept such wage o¤er, whatever his
type. Therefore, g makes ex ante pro…ts which are higher or equal than "k, which is impossible
by Lemma 8.
We now show that the wage wkf;i;H proposed by any …rm f to some player i, and accepted
by i whenever ti = H, is such that wkf;i;H ¸ µkH . Suppose not. Then, there exists some
…rm f o¤ering a contract
³
wkf;i;H ; e
k
f;i;H
´
accepted with positive probability by some H type
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workers, where wkf;i;H < µ
k
H . Lemma 9 implies that, for k high enough, no L type worker
accepts this contract. In other words, for k high enough, the extended social payo¤s of any
L type worker accepting
³
wkf;i;H ; e
k
f;i;H
´
are strictly lower than the extended utility obtained
with some alternative contract. Switching contracts modi…es both the material payo¤s and the
inequality payo¤s accruing to some individual. Given that jV 0 (x)j < 1, variations in inequality
induced by unilateral switching of contracts do never o¤set the corresponding variations in
material payo¤s, and unilateral decisions to pick up a contract out of an array of alternatives
are governed solely by material payo¤ concerns. Therefore, for k high enough, no L type worker
accepts
³
wkf;i;H ; e
k
f;i;H
´
because the corresponding material payo¤s are strictly lower than those
obtained with some alternative o¤ered contract. Consider some …rm g making zero pro…ts.
Suppose that g deviates to an empty location and o¤ers the contract
³
µkH ; e
k
f;i;H
´
to some of
f ’s current workers. It is a weakly dominant strategy for all H type workers in f ’s workforce
to accept g’s o¤er given that it increases their material payo¤s, and there is no disutility due
to inequality at g’s new location. The increase in material payo¤s is µkH ¡ wkf;i;H = q"k, for
some q 2 IN. We know that, for k high enough, no L type worker accepts f ’s original contract³
wkf;i;H ; e
k
f;i;H
´
, and this decision is taken by comparing only material payo¤s from di¤erent
contracts. Also, "k # 0, when k ! +1. Therefore, there exists an integer K such that, for
all k ¸ K, no L type worker accepts g’s contract o¤er. When k ¸ K, only H type workers
accept …rm g’s o¤er, and g’s ex post pro…ts with all of them are strictly higher than "k, which
is impossible by Lemma 8.
Therefore, for all k ¸ K, k 2 IN, f 2 F and i 2 N , we have wkf;i;L ¸ µkL and wkF;i;H ¸ µkH .
By Lemma 8, …rms make ex ante pro…ts which are nonnegative and smaller or equal than "k.
Therefore, wkf;i;L = µ
k
L and w
k
f;i;H = µ
k
H .
Proof of Proposition 4. Let k 2 IN and Gk the corresponding game. Consider a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of Gk, denoted by ¤SPNE. Given a location `, denote by n` the number
of workers employed at ` and at its two adjacent nodes at ¤SPNE. We have n` = n`;L + n`;H ,
where n`;t denotes the number of t type workers employed at ` and at its two adjacent nodes,
t 2 fL;Hg. For all t 2 fL;Hg, let
q`;t =
(
n`;t
n`
, if n` 6= 0
0, otherwise
We prove that q`;t 2 f0; 1g, for all t 2 fL;Hg. Suppose not. Let ` such that 0 < q`;L < 1.12
Let `0 be an empty location surrounded by two empty locations. The assumption L ¸ 3F + 1
guarantees that such an `0 exists.
We now prove that workers employed at ` experience a nonzero disutility due to inequality
at ¤SPNE. Suppose not. By assumption, x 6= 0 implies V (x) > 0. Denote by u¤i the material
payo¤s of player i at ¤SPNE and by U¤i its extended social payo¤s. Then, for all i; j employed at
` and its two adjacent nodes, U¤i = u
¤
i = u
¤
j = U
¤
j . Given that 0 < q`;L < 1, there exists at least
two workers of di¤erent types employed at ` or its vicinity which are in the direct neighborhood
of each other. We denote those workers by iL and iH , where tiL = L and tiH = H. In the
e¤ort-wage space, denote by U±H the strict upper contour set corresponding to the material
12Note that q`;L = 1¡ q`;H , and 0 < q`;H < 1 is equivalent to 0 < q`;L < 1.
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payo¤s of iH , and by UL the upper contour set corresponding to the material payo¤s of iL.
Let ©k = (U±HnUL) \
n
w < µkH j w 2 £k
o
. For k high enough, ©k 6= ;. Indeed, denote by³
w¤`;iH ; e
¤
`;iH
´
the contract accepted by iH at location ` at ¤SPNE, where w¤`;iH 2 £k. Let³
w; e¤`;iH
´
, w 2 £k, such that uiL
³
w; e¤`;iH
´
= uiH
³
w¤`;iH ; e
¤
`;iH
´
. Given that, for all e 2 IR+,
cL (e) > cH (e), necessarily w > w¤`;iH . For k high enough, there exists some w
0 2 £k such that
w > w0 > w¤`;iH , implying that U±HnUL 6= ;. If k is high enough, we also have ©k 6= ;. Consider
some …rm g making zero pro…ts at ¤SPNE. Suppose that g deviates to `0 and o¤ers a contracts
( ew; e) 2 ©k. We know from Lemma 9 that, at equilibrium, when k is high enough, no L type
worker accepts the contract with which iH obtains U¤iH = u
¤
iH at `. Recall also from the proof
of Lemma 10 that unilateral deviations to pick up a contract out of an array of alternatives are
governed solely by material payo¤s concerns. Therefore, for high enough values of k, ( ew;e) 2 ©k
can be chosen so as not to be accepted by any L type worker. Then, g only attracts H type
workers to `0 (those initially employed at `, and possibly some others). We deduce from Lemma
10 that H type workers are paid µkH at equilibrium. By construction of ©
k, ew < µkH . Therefore,
g makes ex ante pro…ts which are higher or equal than "k, which is impossible by Lemma 8.
Therefore, at `, employed workers face a strictly positive disutility due to inequality. Any
L type worker employed at ` would be strictly better o¤ at `0 with the same contract because
he would face a smaller disutility due to inequality. Therefore, any …rm making zero pro…ts at
the current equilibrium (the assumption F > N guarantees that such a …rm exists) moving to
`0 and o¤ering a contract µkL ¡ "k, where k is high enough, could attract such L type workers
(and possibly some H type workers too) and make ex ante pro…ts strictly higher than "k, thus
violating Lemma 4.
Proof of Example 1. To show that this is indeed part of a subgame perfect equilibrium, we
need to specify the responses of the workers to deviations by the …rms. In fact we do not need to
specify responses to all possible deviations, but only to unilateral deviations of one …rm. Worker
H is already obtaining a salary equal to productivity, so no deviation that intends to attract H
can ever be pro…table. Thus, the only possibly pro…table deviations are those that a¤ect worker
L. Clearly, …rm 3 is already making the maximum possible pro…t in this environment, so only
deviations by …rms 1, 2 and 4 need to be considered:
(a) Suppose that …rm 1 deviates by o¤ering L, at some location, the wage w1L, with µL > w
1
L >
w3L. If worker H responds to this deviation by choosing to work for …rm 4, and worker L
responds by choosing to work for …rm 2, then the deviation by 1 is not pro…table.
(b) Suppose that …rm 2 deviates by o¤ering L, at some location, the wage w2L, with µL > w
2
L >
w3L. If worker H responds to this deviation by choosing to work for …rm 4, and worker L
responds by choosing to work for …rm 1, then the deviation by 2 is not pro…table.
(c) Suppose that …rm 4 deviates by o¤ering L, at some location, the wage w4L, with µL > w
4
L >
w3L. If worker H responds to this deviation by choosing to work for …rm 3, and worker L
responds by choosing to work for …rm 2, then the deviation by 4 is not pro…table.
Proof of Example 7. It is readily checked that this game has two subgame perfect Nash
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equilibria (modulo a relabelling of nodes). In both cases, workers are paid exactly their produc-
tivity at equilibrium:
(a) a segregated equilibrium, where both H type workers are located at node 1, and both L
type workers are located at node 2, and individual extended payo¤s at equilibrium are
Ui = µti , i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g.
(b) a non-segregated equilibrium, where H type workers are located at nodes 1 and 2, and L
type workers at nodes 3 and 4, and extended payo¤s are Ui = µti¡®¢=2, i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g.
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